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Minimal Frames and Transparent Frames for Risk, Time, and Uncertainty 
Jonathan Leland        Mark Schneider        Nathaniel T. Wilcox 
Behavior differs between transparent and nontransparent presentations of decisions, but ‘transparent 
presentation’ has not been precisely defined. We formally define ‘transparent frames’ for risk and time, 
establish their uniqueness, provide algorithms for constructing them, and compare them to ‘standard’ 
presentation formats. A logic emerges for predicting systematic shifts in choice under risk and over time, 
and how violations of rational choice theory will depend on frames. An experiment verifies most of those 
predictions in choice under risk. We extend results to choice under uncertainty and also predict frame 
dependence of ambiguity aversion, a result supported by recent experimental evidence. 
1. Introduction 
Among challenges to the descriptive validity of the expected utility hypothesis, none is more widely 
studied than Allais’ (1953) common consequence effect, an example of which is shown below.   
         
 G1: $500,000 with probability 1  G2: $2,500,000 with probability 0.10  
      $500,000 with probability 0.89  
      0 with probability 0.01           
 G3: $500,000 with probability 0.11  G4: $2,500,000 with probability 0.10  
  0 with probability 0.89   0 with probability 0.90            
When asked to choose between G1 and G2 and between G3 and G4, many people, including prominent 
decision theorists like Leonard Savage, exhibit more risk aversion in the first choice than in the second, 
finding G1 more attractive than G2, and G4 more attractive than G3. This pattern violates expected utility 
theory. One suggested explanation is that people overweight certainty relative to possibility, as captured by 
the weighting function in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) original version of prospect theory. 
Savage (1954, p. 102) suggested that people choose G1 over G2 because “they do not find the chance 
of winning a very large fortune in place of receiving a large fortune outright adequate compensation for 
even a small risk of being left at the status quo” and select G4 over G3 because “the chance of winning is 
nearly the same in both gambles, so the larger prize appears preferable.” Savage then reframes the choice 
problems as a state-based matrix where states across choice alternatives are correlated (shown below).   
      
  Ticket Numbers  
  1 2 – 11 12 – 100        
 G1: $500,000 $500,000 $500,000  
 G2: 0 $2,500,000 $500,000        
 G3: $500,000 $500,000 0  
 G4: 0 $2,500,000 0         
In these reframed options, the prize depends on the draw of a ticket from a bag containing 100 numbered 
tickets. Given this reframing, Savage chose in accordance with the independence axiom and in a 
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consistently risk averse manner, expressing a preference for G1 over G2 and for G3 over G4. Savage felt 
that his revision of the latter choice, brought about by this new frame, had “corrected an error” (p. 103). 
Three decades later, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) presented additional and, perhaps, even more 
compelling evidence of decision errors that are sensitive to framing. They report that all 88 of their 
experimental subjects chose B over A given the choice shown below, in which probabilities of outcomes 
in each option are expressed as percentages of marbles of different colors in a box governing each option: 
        
 Option A 90% white $0 
6% red 
win $45 
1% green 
win $30 
1% blue 
lose $15 
2% yellow 
lose $15 
 
        
 Option B 90% white $0 
6% red 
win $45 
1% green 
win $45 
1% blue 
lose $10 
2% yellow 
lose $15 
 
         
Option B stochastically dominates A since it offers a 1% chance of a larger gain ($45 versus $30) and a 1% 
chance of a smaller loss (-$10 versus -$15). However, they observed that a majority (58%) of subjects chose 
C over D with the alternatives presented differently, as below:  
       
 Option C 90% white $0 
6% red 
win $45 
1% green 
win $30 
3% yellow 
lose $15 
 
       
 Option D 90% white $0 
7% red 
win $45 
1% green 
lose $10 
2% yellow 
lose $15 
 
        
The choice of C versus D reframes that between A and B. Option C is obtained from A by combining the 
1% blue and 2% yellow chances of losing $15 while D is obtained from B by combining the 6% red and 
1% green chances of winning $45.1 This produces an economical or ‘minimal’ presentation in the sense 
that the matrix has fewer columns; yet this presentation masks the dominance relation and, moreover, 
juxtaposes the 1% chance of $30 against the 1% chance of -$10, which now drives the choice. 
Intuitively the dominance relationship is ‘more transparent’ in the choice between options A and B. 
However, in addition to such intuitions concerning relative transparency—as held by Savage (1954) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986)—is there also a logic of transparency that can be formalized and generalized 
to a wider class of decision problems? Commenting on the Tversky and Kahneman (1986) paper, Hogarth 
and Reder (1986) note that “Tversky and Kahneman do not specify the conditions under which people 
perceive problems as transparent or opaque” (p. S192). This issue has apparently not been addressed in the 
subsequent literature: there is no general theory of ‘transparency’ of choice presentations.  
We offer precise definitions of presentations or frames for choice under risk and over time, propose a 
property list for transparent frames, and show that these properties imply unique presentations of choice 
problems. We also define a minimal frame and identify it with many standard presentations of choice 
                                                     
1  Birnbaum and Navarrette (1998) and Luce (1998) refer to this combining of the probabilities of identical 
outcomes as “coalescing.” Earlier, Starmer and Sugden (1993) had called the opposite operation “event-splitting.” 
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problems. We then apply a model of salience-based choice to derive behavioral predictions in minimal and 
transparent frames, and test for these predicted choice differences in a new experiment involving choice 
under risk. Finally, we extend the model to choice under ambiguity, where we derive the novel prediction 
that ambiguity aversion is frame-dependent. 
2. Presentations or Frames 
Figure 1. Presentations or Frames for Decisions under Risk and over Time 
    
  Choice Frame for Lotteries  
    
  (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  (xi,yi) (pi,qi)  (xn,yn) (pn,qn)  
 𝐩𝐩 x1 p1 x2 p2 … xi pi … xn pn  
 𝐪𝐪 y1 q1 y2 q2 … yi qi … yn qn      
  Choice Frame for Income Streams  
    
  (x1,y1) (r1,t1) (x2,y2) (r2,t2)  (xi,yi) (ri,ti)  (xn,yn) (rn,tn)  
 𝐫𝐫 x1 r1 x2 r2 … xi ri … xn rn  
 𝐭𝐭 y1 t1 y2 t2 … yi ti … yn tn                
2.1 Lotteries, Income Streams and their Frames 
Frames present pairs of options as shown above in Figure 1. Let 𝑋𝑋 be a finite set of potential outcomes. 
A lottery is a mapping 𝑝𝑝:𝑋𝑋 → [0,1] such that ∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = 1𝑥𝑥∈𝑋𝑋 , and ∆(𝑋𝑋) is the set of all such lotteries. Now 
consider a pair of one-dimensional finite arrays 𝐩𝐩 and 𝐪𝐪, representing lotteries 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞 and offering a finite 
and equal number of outcomes denoted 𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢 and 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛, where each 𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢 occurs with probability 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 
and each 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢 occurs with probability 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢: The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates the pair of arrays. We call ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ 
a frame or presentation of lottery pair {𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞}, and say that ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ presents {𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞}, if and only if 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) =
∑ 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢{𝑖𝑖 |𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢=𝑥𝑥}  and 𝑞𝑞(𝑦𝑦) = ∑ 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢{𝑖𝑖 | 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢=𝑦𝑦} . Let 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝) denote the support of 𝑝𝑝 (the set of outcomes such that 
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) > 0). Note that 𝑛𝑛 may exceed |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)| and/or |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞)|, where |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)| denotes the number of 
outcomes in a support: This is a key difference between frames ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ and the pairs {𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞} they present.  
For decisions over discrete time periods i ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, T}, intertemporal income streams r and t are 
finite sequences of outcomes, each assigning one outcome to each period. Denote the set of income streams 
by 𝐶𝐶. We also study choices between income streams 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑡𝑡, where 𝑟𝑟: = (𝑥𝑥0, 𝑥𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇) and 𝑡𝑡: =(𝑦𝑦0,𝑦𝑦1, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇). Here, a frame ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧ is again a pair of one-dimensional finite arrays 𝐫𝐫 and 𝐭𝐭 representing 
income streams 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑡𝑡 and offering a finite and equal number of outcomes, where each outcome 𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢 occurs 
in time period 𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐢 and each 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢 occurs in period 𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐢: The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates such a pair of 
arrays. Bold fonts denote attributes as presented in a frame, while italicized fonts denote the underlying 
lotteries, income streams and the attributes in their supports. 
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2.2 Defining Minimal Frames and Transparent Frames 
We provide here an intuitive treatment of minimal and transparent frames (our appendix gives formal 
definitions and uniqueness demonstrations). Transparent frames are reminiscent of Savage’s (1954) state 
matrix representation of lotteries, but assume neither statistical independence nor correlation between 
payoffs.  Minimal frames are compact presentations of choices and, for choice under risk, formalize the 
‘prospect’ presentation of lotteries pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Minimal frames for choice 
under risk contain no redundancy: the same outcome does not appear in the representation of a lottery more 
than once. Similarly, in minimal frames for choice over time, any time period appears just once in 
presentations of income streams, and the frame contains the fewest columns necessary to present (all of the 
non-zero payoffs in) the income streams.  
Though both Savage (1954) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued that people are more likely to 
make better decisions when choices are presented in a more transparent format, it appears that no prior 
work precisely articulated what properties would characterize a transparent presentation of decisions. To 
address this gap, we propose that a transparent frame for lotteries satisfies properties 1 – 5: 
1. Common Consequence Separation: Identify the common consequences (the payoff-probability pairs 
that contain the same outcomes and corresponding probabilities) of the lotteries being compared and 
separate them from distinct consequences (the other payoff-probability pairs in the frame). 
2. Monotonicity: Order the outcomes of distinct consequences in decreasing order such that the ith best 
outcome in one lottery is in the same column as the ith best outcome in the other lottery. 
3. Alignment: Set the probabilities within each column equal to each other. 
4. Completeness: Ensure that the probabilities for each row in the frame sum to 1. 
5. Relevance: Ensure the probabilities in each column vector are positive.   
Our appendix provides an algorithm for constructing a unique transparent frame satisfying these five 
properties for any lottery pair (including those with different numbers of outcomes in their support). 
The five properties serve as heuristics for framing a decision to help articulate and focus on the relevant 
information: Together they simplify comparison of alternatives. The properties also have intuitive appeal. 
The common consequence separation property isolates shared payoff-probability pairs in lotteries, thus 
focusing attention on how the lotteries differ. Monotonicity ensures that the best payoffs in one lottery are 
compared to the best payoffs in another lottery. The alignment property sets the probabilities equal within 
each column vector in a frame so that when comparing any payoff-probability pair in the same column, one 
need only compare the two payoffs. The completeness property ensures that all outcomes in the support of 
a lottery are included so that all information about the choice alternatives is accounted for in the decision. 
The relevance property ensures that no irrelevant outcomes (those with probability zero) are considered. 
The properties may help a person focus on the tradeoffs needed to make a quality decision.  
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For decisions over time, we propose similar properties that a transparent frame should satisfy: 
1. Common Consequence Separation: Identify the common consequences (the payoff-time pairs that 
contain the same outcomes and the same corresponding delays) of the income streams being    
compared and separate them from distinct consequences. 
2. Monotonicity: Order the timing of distinct consequences in strictly increasing order such that the ith 
soonest period in one income stream is in the same column as the ith soonest period in the other. 
3. Alignment: Set the time periods within each column equal to each other.  
4. Completeness: Ensure that all time periods indexed by the income streams are included. 
5. Relevance: Ensure that only time periods indexed by the income streams are included. 
These five properties also have intuitive appeal and justification. Common consequence separation 
puts attention on where the two alternatives differ. Monotonicity reflects the intuition that time has a natural 
forward direction and it may help one to consider time periods sequentially. The alignment property ensures 
that the time periods within each column of a frame are the same, standardizing outcomes within each 
column to have the same ‘time value of money’. Alignment also enables a decision maker who is comparing 
two payoff-time pairs in a given pair of columns to focus on the differences in payoffs, rather than trading 
off both risk and time within those columns. Completeness ensures that all relevant time periods and payoffs 
are considered. The relevance property ensures that only relevant time periods and payoffs are considered. 
In particular, it encourages the decision maker to be forward looking as it does not display sunk costs (e.g., 
from previous income outcomes) that occurred prior to the dates indexed by the income streams. We show 
in the appendix that for any pair of income streams there is a unique frame satisfying these five properties.  
3. Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations 
Leland and Schneider’s (2017) Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP) is a simple 
decision model that operates on frames as we define them here.2 SWUP predicts differences between choice 
behavior for minimal and transparent frames, so we now briefly motivate and review the SWUP model.  
3.1 Salience Weighted Utility of Presentations for Choice under Risk 
In a standard expected utility model of choice under risk, 𝑝𝑝 is chosen over 𝑞𝑞 if and only if (1) holds: 
(1)  ∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) > ∑ 𝑞𝑞(𝑦𝑦)𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦)𝑦𝑦∈𝑋𝑋𝑥𝑥∈𝑋𝑋 ,  
where 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) is a utility function denoting payoffs to the decision maker from outcomes 𝑥𝑥. 3 Leland and 
Schneider (2017) consider choices over frames as in the top panel of Figure 1, where (1) can be written 
equivalently as (2). (We use bold font to denote outcomes and probabilities in a frame): 
                                                     
2 Leland and Schneider (2017) focus entirely on developing SWUP, the salience-based decision model for frames, 
but do not develop the predictions of this model for different frames (nor test these) as we do here. 
3 All of our theoretical results hold when 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥. However we leave open the possibility that 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) is concave for 
gains (as in standard risk-averse EU), or additionally convex for losses and exhibiting loss aversion (as in Wakker 
and Tversky’s nonstandard Sign-Dependent Expected Utility or SDEU).  
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(2)  ∑ 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢) > ∑ 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ,  
Inequality (1) pertains to choices over lotteries 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞 (regardless of how they are framed), whereas (2) 
pertains to choices over a particular frame ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ presenting lotteries 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞. Note that (1) and (2) provide 
an alternative-based evaluation - one lottery is strictly preferred to another, if and only if it yields a greater 
expected payoff to the decision maker.  
Building on Leland and Sileo (1998), the alternative-based evaluation in (2) may be rewritten 
equivalently as an attribute-based evaluation such that  𝐩𝐩 is chose over 𝐪𝐪 if and only if (3) holds: 
(3)  ∑ [(𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 − 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢)(𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢) + 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢))/2 + (𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢))(𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 + 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢)/2] > 0.𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
Note that (2) and (3) operate over frames rather than over lotteries directly. Leland and Schneider (2017) 
then allow for the possibility that the agent systematically overweights salient differences in probabilities 
and payoffs by introducing salience weights 𝜙𝜙(𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢,𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢) on probability differences and 𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢, 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢) on payoff 
differences. This yields Leland and Schneider’s Salience-Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP) 
model of choice under risk, in which 𝐩𝐩 is chosen over 𝐪𝐪 if and only if 
(4)  ∑ [𝜙𝜙(𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢,𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢)(𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 − 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢)(𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢) + 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢))/2 + 𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢,𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢)(𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢))(𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 + 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢)/2] > 0𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 .  
3.2  Salience Weighted Utility for Choice over Time 
The SWUP model extends to choices over time as shown in the lower panel of Figure 1. In the 
discounted utility model, a person always chooses income stream 𝑎𝑎 over 𝑏𝑏 if and only if (5) holds: 
 (5)   ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) > ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=0𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=0 , 
where δ is a constant discount factor. Through an analogous development to (4), Leland and Schneider 
(2017) propose (6) as the corresponding generalization of discounted utility theory to allow for 
overweighting salient differences in payoffs and time delays. Placing salience weights 𝜃𝜃(𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐢, 𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐢) on time 
differences and 𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢, 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢) on payoff differences gives this salience-weighted evaluation in which 𝐫𝐫 is always 
chosen over 𝐭𝐭 if and only if 
(6)   ∑ [𝜃𝜃(𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐢, 𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐢)(𝛿𝛿𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐢 − 𝛿𝛿𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐢)(𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢))/2 + 𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢, 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢)(𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢))(𝛿𝛿𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐢 + 𝛿𝛿𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐢)/2] > 0, 
whenever the frame ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧ presents income streams 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑡𝑡.  
3.3 Salience Weighted Utility for Choice under Ambiguity 
Leland and Schneider (2017) introduced SWUP for choices under risk and over time. Here we extend 
SWUP to the domain of uncertainty, where probabilities of some events are unknown. Suppose there is a 
finite set of possible states of nature 𝑠𝑠 ∈  {1,2, … , 𝑆𝑆}, where a lottery is assigned to be played in each state. 
Denote uncertain prospects by 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑔𝑔, where 𝑓𝑓 assigns lottery 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠) to each state 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑔𝑔 assigns lottery 
𝑔𝑔(𝑠𝑠) to each state 𝑠𝑠. In the classic alternative-based evaluation, there is assumed to be a unique subjective 
probability distribution, 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠, over states (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) such that 𝑓𝑓 is preferred over 𝑔𝑔 if 
and only if (7) holds (where 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) is the probability of outcome 𝑥𝑥 in state 𝑠𝑠): 
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(7)  ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠[𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥)𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥)]𝑥𝑥∈𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆 > ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠[𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦)𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦)].𝑦𝑦∈𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆  
Let there be a frame for each state, where 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 indexes the ith attribute in the frame in state 𝑠𝑠. Given two multi-
dimensional arrays 𝐟𝐟 = {𝐟𝐟𝟏𝟏, … , 𝐟𝐟𝐒𝐒} and 𝐠𝐠 = {𝐠𝐠𝟏𝟏, … , 𝐠𝐠𝐒𝐒}, the analogous formula to (5) is 𝐟𝐟 is always chosen 
over 𝐠𝐠 if and only if (8) holds: 
(8)   ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠[𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)]𝑛𝑛(𝑠𝑠)𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 > ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠[𝐠𝐠𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)]𝑛𝑛(𝑠𝑠)𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 .  
Next, we introduce the corresponding model of salience-weighted evaluation in which 𝐟𝐟 is always chosen 
over 𝐠𝐠 if and only if (9) holds:  
(9)  ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠[𝜙𝜙(𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢, 𝐠𝐠𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)(𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 − 𝐠𝐠𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)(𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢) + 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢))/2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠   
     + 𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢, 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)(𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢))(𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 + 𝐠𝐠𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)/2] > 0. 
We refer to agents who choose according to salience-based evaluation models (the representations 4, 6, and 
9) as focal thinkers since such agents focus on salient differences in attributes. Such an agent chooses the 
alternative which ‘looks better’ with respect to that agent’s perceptual system.  
3.4   Properties of Salience Perceptions 
The salience functions 𝜇𝜇,𝜙𝜙 and 𝜃𝜃 determine the only ways in which the behavior of a focal thinker 
differs from a rational agent who chooses according to formulas 1, 5 and 7. We assume a salience function 
exhibits the two properties of the perceptual system in Definition 1, introduced by Bordalo et al. (2012).  
Definition 1 (Salience Function): A salience function σ(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢) is any continuous, non-negative and 
symmetric (σ(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢) = σ(𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢,𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢)) function of 𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢 and 𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢 ∈ ℝ that satisfies the following two properties: 
1. Ordering: If [𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢′,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢′] ⊂ [𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢] then σ(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢′,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢′) < σ(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢). 
2. Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity (DAS): σ(. ) exhibits diminishing sensitivity if for any 𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢, 𝜖𝜖 > 0,
σ(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢 + 𝜖𝜖,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢 + 𝜖𝜖) < σ(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢).  
In addition to properties 1 and 2 from Bordalo et al. (2012), we will allow for the possibility that a salience 
function satisfies a third property, increasing proportional sensitivity:   
3. Increasing Proportional Sensitivity (IPS): σ(. ) exhibits increasing proportional sensitivity if for any 
𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢 > 0 and any 𝛼𝛼 > 1, σ(𝛼𝛼𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝛼𝛼𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢) > σ(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢).  
There is a close relationship between DAS and IPS: DAS implies that for a fixed absolute difference, 
the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger ratios, while IPS implies that for a fixed ratio, the 
perceptual system is more sensitive to larger absolute differences. We will show that for focal thinkers, IPS 
for 𝜙𝜙 implies the general version of the Allais common ratio effect, and DAS for 𝜙𝜙 implies ambiguity 
aversion in Ellsberg’s paradox in minimal frame presentations. Our approach thus provides a unified 
treatment of Allais-style and Ellsberg-style behavior and shows that they can be derived from basic 
properties of the probability salience function 𝜙𝜙 without requiring any parametric assumptions about the 
underlying salience functions or utility functions.   
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4. Minimal and Transparent Frames for Choice under Risk   
We now consider what SWUP implies when alternatives are presented in a minimal versus a 
transparent frame, beginning with choices under risk. For frames with degenerate lotteries (those yielding 
a single outcome with probability 1), it seems almost unavoidable that one compares each outcome in the 
non-degenerate lottery 𝐪𝐪 to the unique outcome in the degenerate lottery 𝐩𝐩. So when one lottery in a pair is 
degenerate, we adopt the convention that monotone minimal frames appear as shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Choice Frame with a Degenerate Lottery 𝐩𝐩 
             
  (𝐱𝐱𝟏𝟏, 𝐲𝐲𝟏𝟏) (𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏,𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏) (𝐱𝐱𝟐𝟐, 𝐲𝐲𝟐𝟐) (𝐩𝐩𝟐𝟐,𝐪𝐪𝟐𝟐) …    (𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢,𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢) (𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢,𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢) … (𝐱𝐱𝐧𝐧, 𝐲𝐲𝐧𝐧) (𝐩𝐩𝐧𝐧,𝐪𝐪𝐧𝐧)  
 𝐩𝐩  𝐱𝐱 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏 𝐱𝐱 𝐪𝐪𝟐𝟐 … 𝐱𝐱 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢 … 𝐱𝐱 𝐪𝐪𝐧𝐧  
 𝐪𝐪  𝐲𝐲𝟏𝟏 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏 𝐲𝐲𝟐𝟐 𝐪𝐪𝟐𝟐 … 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢 … 𝐲𝐲𝐧𝐧 𝐪𝐪𝐧𝐧               
 
4.1 The Stochastic Dominance Axiom in Minimal and Transparent Frames 
One of the most basic axioms of rational choice is consistency with first-order stochastic dominance: 
If a lottery 𝑝𝑝 offers at least as good an outcome at every probability increment as a lottery 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑝𝑝 offers a 
strictly better outcome at some probability increment, then 𝑝𝑝 stochastically dominates 𝑞𝑞. Consider again 
the example due to Tversky and Kahneman (1986) from Section 2, shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Stochastic Dominance in Minimal and Transparent Frames 
     
   Stochastic Dominance in Minimal Frames        
   x1,y1 p1,q1 x2,y2 p2,q2 x3,y3 p3,q3 x4,y4 p4,q4   
  p′ 0 0.90 45 0.07 -10 0.01 -15 0.02   
  q′ 0 0.90 45 0.06 30 0.01 -15 0.03   
             
 Stochastic Dominance in Transparent Frames      
  x1,y1 p1,q1 x2,y2 p2,q2 x3,y3 p3,q3 x4,y4 p4,q4 x5,y5 p5,q5  
 p 45 0.01 -10 0.01 45 0.06 0 0.90 -15 0.02  
 q 30 0.01 -15 0.01 45 0.06 0 0.90 -15 0.02  
              
Given a transparent presentation of lotteries 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞, all subjects chose the stochastically dominant 
alternative, 𝑝𝑝 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).  However, when presented in a minimal frame as 𝑝𝑝' and 𝑞𝑞' 
many subjects violated dominance. Similar dominance violations have also been observed in several studies 
by Birnbaum and his colleagues (e.g., Birnbaum and Navarette, 1998; Birnbaum, 1999). For transparent 
frames, a focal thinker will satisfy stochastic dominance. Since payoffs are ordered monotonically, any 
differences in (3) will favor the stochastically dominant lottery.  
4.2 The Independence Axiom in Minimal and Transparent Frames 
The Allais common consequence paradox (Allais, 1953) involves choices like those in the left panel 
of Figure 4. A decision maker chooses between lottery 𝑞𝑞, offering $2400 with certainty and a lottery 𝑝𝑝, 
offering a 33% chance of $2500, a 66% chance of $2400, and a 1% chance of $0. The decision maker then 
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chooses between lottery 𝑞𝑞� offering a 34% chance of $2400 and lottery 𝑝𝑝� offering a 33% chance of $2500. 
In such choices, most subjects choose 𝑞𝑞 over 𝑝𝑝 and choose 𝑝𝑝� over 𝑞𝑞� (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This 
preference pattern is inconsistent with EU which predicts preferences of either 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑝𝑝� or 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑞𝑞�. 
Figure 4. The Allais Paradox in Minimal and Transparent Frames 
                                
  Allais Paradox in Minimal Frames   Allais Paradox in Transparent Frames                   
  x1,y1      p1,q1      x2,y2      p2,q2       x3,y3     p3,q3               x1,y1      p1,q1       x2,y2      p2,q2      x3,y3       p3,q3  
 p 2500 0.33 2400 0.66 0 0.01  p 2500 0.33    0 0.01 2400 0.66  
 q 2400 0.33 2400 0.66 2400 0.01  q 2400 0.33 2400 0.01 2400 0.66  
                 
  x1,y1      p1,q1 x2,y2 p2,q2                                          x1,y1      p1,q1       x2,y2      p2,q2       x3,y3      p3,q3  
 𝐩𝐩� 2500 0.33 0 0.67     p�  2500 0.33 0 0.01 0 0.66  
 q�  2400 0.34 0 0.66     𝐪𝐪� 2400 0.33 2400 0.01 0 0.66  
                  
In the choice between 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞 in minimal frames, the comparison of 2400 and 0 is more salient than 
that of 2500 and 2400, which favors 𝑞𝑞. However, in the choice between 𝑝𝑝� and 𝑞𝑞�, the comparison between 
2400 and 0 is not cued. Instead, the decision maker compares the upside of winning 2500 instead of 2400 
with the downside of forfeiting a 1% chance in the probability of winning. To the extent this $100 difference 
is more salient than the 0.01 difference in probabilities, the decision maker chooses 𝑝𝑝� over 𝑞𝑞�. Now consider 
the transparent frames in Figure 4. Here, the components common to each decision (i.e., ($2400, 0.66) in 
the choice between 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞 and ($0, 0.66) in the choice between 𝑝𝑝� and 𝑞𝑞�) are isolated and the decision in 
both cases depends on comparisons between 2500 and 2400 and between 2400 and 0.  
Many scholars replicated Allais’ (1953) demonstration of common consequence violations in minimal 
frames, but there is only mixed evidence regarding the prediction that common consequence effects will 
not occur in transparent frames. Moskowitz (1974) examined common consequence choice pairs presented 
either in a minimal written form as in the introduction, as tree diagrams, or as transparent matrices like the 
one proposed by Savage and shown in the introduction. Contrary to our predictions, there were no 
differences in the proportion of consistent responses among subjects given written or matrix presentations, 
although both were higher than for tree diagrams. However, Keller (1985), Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher 
(2012) and Harman and Gonzalez (2015) all find that more transparent presentations reduce the occurrence 
of common consequence violations. In their summary, Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher say, “We find that 
given a transparent presentation, expected utility theory performs surprisingly well, and that the alternative 
theories perform poorly except inasmuch as they make the same predictions as expected utility theory.”   
Allais’ (1953) common ratio effect is a second well-known violation of EU. Figure 5 displays a classic 
version due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The minimal frames display a choice between lotteries 𝑝𝑝 
and 𝑞𝑞, offering an 80% chance of $4000 versus $3000 with certainty, and a choice between 𝑝𝑝� and 𝑞𝑞�, offering 
a 20% chance of $4000 versus a 25% chance of $3000. In this example, a majority of subjects chose 𝑞𝑞 over 
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𝑝𝑝 and chose 𝑝𝑝� over 𝑞𝑞� when the choices were presented in minimal frames. This response pattern violates 
EU which predicts choices of either 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑝𝑝� or 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑞𝑞�. In the transparent frames in Figure 5, the salient 
comparisons in both choices are between 3000 and 0 and between 4000 and 3000. Since the same 
comparisons are focal in both choices, one might predict more consistent behavior in transparent frames. 
Figure 5. The Common Ratio Effect Presented in Minimal and Transparent Frames 
                            
 In Minimal Frames In Transparent Frames                 
   x1,y1 p1,q1   x2,y2    p2,q2                   x1,y1 p1,q1   x2,y2    p2,q2                    
   p 4000 0.80 0 0.20  p 4000 0.80 0 0.20    
   q 3000 0.80 3000 0.20  q 3000 0.80 3000 0.20    
    
  x1,y1 p1,q1 x2,y2 p2,q2   x1,y1 p1,q1 x2,y2 p2,q2 x3,y3 p3,q3  
    𝐩𝐩� 4000 0.20 0 0.80  p�  4000 0.20 0 0.05 0 0.75  
    q�  3000 0.25 0 0.75  𝐪𝐪� 3000 0.20 3000 0.05 0 0.75  
                
Allais (1953) demonstrated the common ratio effect for choices presented in minimal frames.  Harless 
(1992) showed that minimal presentations of common ratio choices violate independence while transparent 
frames do not. He presented different groups of subjects with choices such as a choice between S:($8,000, 
0.10; $0, 0.90) and R:($20,000, 0.05; $0, 0.95) and one between S′:($8,000, 0.60; $0, 0.40) and R′:($20,000, 
0.30; $0, 0.70). One group received both choices in a transparent matrix format in the top of Figure 6. 
Another group was presented with choices in a minimal ‘tickets’ frame in the bottom of Figure 6. As 
predicted by SWUP, Harless found that deviations from EU were unsystematic in the transparent frame and 
systematic and in the predicted Allais direction in the minimal frame. Harless also examined how different 
juxtapositions of payoffs across choices would influence the incidence and direction of common ratio 
violations in matrix frames. Those results are also consistent with the predictions of SWUP.4 Keller (1985) 
also found that proportional matrix presentations reduce the occurrence of common ratio violations; yet 
Figure 6. Transparent Matrix and Minimal ‘Tickets’ Presentations used by Harless (1992) 
           
  Transparent Tickets Matrix Presentation             
  1-5 6-10 11-100   1-30 31-60 61-100  
 S $8 $8 $0  S′ $8 $8 $0  
 R $20 $0 $0  R′ $20 $0 $0  
           
  Minimal Tickets Presentation             
 S Ticket 1-10 drawn Win $8  S′ Ticket 1-60 drawn Win $8   Ticket 11-100 drawn Win $0  Ticket 61-100 drawn Win $0  
 R Ticket 1-5 drawn Win $20  R′ Ticket 1-30 drawn Win $20   Ticket 6-100 drawn Win $0  Ticket 31-100 drawn Win $0  
           
                                                     
4 Loomes and Sudgen’s (1982) Regret theory and Bordalo et alia’s (2012) salience based model of risky choice also 
predict many of these effects but only for statistically independent lotteries. Leland (1998) shows the behavior 
obtains for statistically dependent lotteries as well. 
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both Loomes and Sugden (1987) and Keller still report many common ratio violations of independence 
(with state matrix and proportional matrix presentations, respectively). 
Starmer and Sugden (1993) and Humphrey (1995) studied another presentation effect known as event 
splitting: Presenting the same event split into many separate ones (for gains) makes that event more 
attractive. SWUP explains event splitting effects when splitting an event transforms a presentation from a 
minimal to a transparent frame, but not when the probabilities within each column vector of a frame are 
aligned in both presentations (so that salient payoff comparisons are the same in original and split frames).  
5. An Experiment on Framing and Decisions under Risk 
Our experiment compares the predictions of three models – the leading normative model of decision 
making (EU), cumulative prospect theory (CPT) due to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and the model of 
salience weighted utility over presentations (SWUP). Since the outcomes in our experiment involve only 
gains, the predictions of CPT coincide with those of rank-dependent utility (RDU) due to Quiggin (1982). 
We use SWUP instead of the salience-based model in Bordalo et al. (2012) since our focus is on framing 
effects. The model in Bordalo et al. (2012) does not predict framing effects between minimal and 
transparent frames, but instead predicts choices are sensitive to correlations between lotteries.  
We test general properties of the models. Choices satisfy stochastic dominance, independence and the 
property called frame invariance (different presentations of the same two lotteries will produce the same 
observed choices) under EU. RDU violates the EU independence axiom (allowing Allais paradoxes), but 
satisfies both stochastic dominance and frame-invariance. SWUP violates frame invariance, and makes the 
strong prediction that the independence axiom and stochastic dominance will be violated in minimal frames, 
but will be satisfied in transparent frames. However, we designed our experiment with a secondary purpose 
in mind: to support estimation of parametric probabilistic choice versions of EU, RDU and SWUP.   
5.1 Experimental Procedure 
Our 137 experimental subjects5 were undergraduate students at a university in the western United 
States in April and May of 2016. We seated subjects at visually isolated computer terminals in lab cubicles. 
Each subject chose one lottery from a lottery pair (no indifference permitted) for 100 distinct pairs presented 
sequentially one at a time on a computer screen. After completing their 100 choices, each subject rolled a 
pair of ten-sided dice, randomly selecting one of their 100 chosen lotteries to count for payment: The subject 
then played out that lottery by selecting a numbered raffle ticket from an opaque bag, receiving a cash 
outcome to keep along with a promised flat $7.00 for timely arrival and participation. 
Figure 7 shows how a pair appeared on subjects’ computer screens (minimal and transparent versions 
are shown, though only one would appear on any screen). If a subject chose the ‘red’ lottery (and this choice 
                                                     
5 We recruited and scheduled 144 students for six sessions of twenty-four subjects each, but seven failed to appear 
bringing the actual total to 137 subjects. 
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was randomly selected for payment), that subject would draw a ticket from an opaque bag containing 100 
red raffle tickets. If the number on the ticket was between 1 and 25, that subject received $30. If the number 
was between 26 and 100, that subject received $06. Computerized instructions (screen prints appear in the 
supplementary materials or SM) explained all this generally and with specific examples, following up with 
tests of understanding (which a subject had to correctly answer before proceeding).  
Figure 7. A Choice Pair in a  Minimal Frame (top) and a Transparent Frame (bottom) 
 
 
5.2 Experimental Design 
Of the 100 lottery pairs, 40 are test pairs (shown in our SM) for hypothesis tests within and between 
transparent and minimal framed pairs, while 60 are estimation pairs to aid efficient estimation of structural 
model parameters. We present lottery pairs in blocked order (randomizing order within each block of ten 
pairs) to space related test pairs (also utilizing estimation pairs for this spacing purpose). Of the 40 test 
pairs, 18 test for common ratio effects (in two groups CR.A and CR.B of nine pairs each), 16 test for Allais’ 
Paradox (common consequence effects) in four groups AP.A, AP.B, AP.C, and AP.D of four pairs each, 
and 6 pairs test for dominance violation effects (in three groups DV.A, DV.B and DV.C of two pairs each). 
Table 1 shows predictions made by EU, CPT/RDU, and SWUP in our design. Under EU we should 
observe none of the usual regularities and frame invariance of choices. While CPT/RDU permit common 
ratio effects and Allais’ Paradox, they rule out dominance violations and also imply frame invariance. 
SWUP predicts that none of the regularities are observed in transparent frames, but that all of them can be  
Table 1. Predictions of Different Models for Minimal and Transparent Frames 
 Common Ratio Effect Allais Paradox Dominance Violation 
Model Minimal Transparent Minimal Transparent Minimal Transparent 
EU * * * * * * 
CPT/RDU     * * 
SWUP  *  *  * 
Notes:  indicates behavior is predicted; * indicates behavior is not predicted. 
                                                     
6 Another bag of blue tickets was used to resolve “blue” lotteries. Using two separate devices for each lottery in a 
pair induces statistically independent lotteries as opposed to statistically dependent ones. While SWUP is insensitive 
to this distinction, other theories are not: We wished to preserve interpretability relative to these other theories. 
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observed in minimal frames (and hence does not predict frame invariance). For instance, even with linear 
utility, SWUP explain the classical versions of the common consequence effect and common ratio effect in 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the violation of stochastic dominance in Tversky and Kahneman (1986) 
in minimal frames, but SWUP satisfies independence and stochastic dominance in transparent frames. 
5.3 Results: Hypothesis Tests 
 Experimental results in the two common ratio groups of pairs appear in the two panels of Figure 8. 
The inset in each panel is a prospect presentation of the “root pair” {S,R} generating each group of common 
ratio pairs. Because the safe lottery S is degenerate in each root pair, minimal and transparent presentations 
of the root pairs are identical: Hence in each panel, only one choice proportion is graphed above the 
common ratio of 1 (the root pair). However, minimal and transparent presentations differ for any pairs 
{S',R'} with common ratio less than 1 (the other pairs in each group), so two choice proportions are graphed 
above those common ratios. The solid (double) line connects minimal (transparent) frame observed risky 
lottery choice proportions within each group. We also show a Bayesian 90% confidence interval (based on 
the Jeffreys Prior as recommended by Brown, Cai and DasGupta 2001) for each proportion, and these 
illustrate two findings: Frame invariance dramatically fails in these common ratio groups; and relative to 
minimal framing, transparent framing strongly promotes choice of safe lotteries. 
Under Conlisk’s (1989) constant error model and EU, proportions of non-EU choice patterns S ∪ R′ 
and R ∪ S′ (involving the root pair and any other pair in a group) should be equivalent: Asterisks above 
each confidence interval in Figure 8 indicate rejection of this hypothesis (* at 5%, and ** at 1%) by a 
likelihood ratio test based on Conlisk’s constant error model. Such rejections are universal in minimal  
Figure 8: Common Ratio Effect in Minimal and Transparent Frames
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frames and, moreover, observed minimal frame choice proportions display a characteristic crossing of the 
0.5 Rubicon as the common ratio gets low enough. Neither result obtains in transparent frames: Risky 
choice proportions rise significantly at the lowest common ratios only, and never exceed 0.5—in keeping 
with simple strength-of-preference explanations (and so not clear evidence of an independence violation).  
Experimental results in the four Allais Paradox (common consequence) groups of pairs appear in the 
four panels of Figure 9. Each group has a pair 1 {S1, R1} and a pair 2 {S2, R2} formed from pair 1 by 
changing a common consequence to zero. We presented these pairs in both minimal and transparent frames, 
so two choice proportions are graphed above each pair. As in Figure 8, the solid (double) line connects 
minimal (transparent) frame observed risky lottery choice proportions within each group, and we show the 
Figure 9: Allais Paradox (Common Consequence Effect) in Minimal and Transparent Frames
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same type of Bayesian 90% confidence interval for each proportion. Note that in pair 1 of each common 
ratio group, the difference between the minimal and transparent frames of {S,R} is slight: SWUP predicts 
no difference between these choices,7 and the data bear this out. However the pair 2 choice proportions 
always differ strongly across the two types of frames: as in the common ratio groups, transparent framing 
strongly promotes the choice of safe lotteries relative to minimal framing.  
In these groups, under Conlisk’s (1989) constant error model and EU, proportions of non-EU choice 
patterns S1 ∪ R2 and R1 ∪ S2 should be equivalent. Asterisks above each confidence interval in Figure 9 
indicate rejection of this hypothesis (* at 5%, and ** at 1%) by a likelihood ratio test. Figure 9 shows that 
this hypothesis is almost always rejected in both minimal and transparent frames; but there is a strong 
difference in the direction of the rejection across these frame types. As predicted by both CPT/RDU and 
SWUP, we observe the pattern S1 ∪ R2 significantly more than the pattern R1 ∪ S2 in minimal frames: This 
is the ‘classic’ Allais result (and so labeled in Figure 9). However, significant ‘reverse’ Allais results appear 
in three of the four groups in transparent frames (S1 ∪ R2 occurs significantly less often than R1 ∪ S2) and 
no theory we know of predicts this. SWUP predicts that no significant Allais pattern (classic or reverse) 
should appear in transparent frames—as observed in group B, but not in groups A, C, and D.  
Choice patterns S1 ∪ S2 and R1 ∪ R2 (in each Allais Paradox group) and choice patterns S ∪ S′ and R ∪ R′ (in each common ratio group) are consistent with EU. The left panel of Figure 10 shows how rates 
of EU consistency vary across transparent frames (the white bars) and minimal frames (the black bars). In 
all twelve pairs of pairs, EU consistency in transparent frames exceeds that in minimal frames, with nine of 
these twelve comparisons significant (at 10% or better) by likelihood ratio tests. The right panel of Figure 
10 compares risk tolerance in minimal and transparent frames. In this case we use only data from the  
Figure 10. EU Consistency and Risk Tolerance in Minimal and Transparent Frames
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Figure 4 illustrated this: There one can see that the top two framings ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ of {𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞} are identical except that the 
transparent frame isolates the common consequence column block at the right, while the monotone minimal frame 
places that column block at the center. Under SWUP such column block switching should have no effect on choice. 
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common ratio pairs {S′, R′} with common ratios less than 1 (where the minimal and transparent frames 
actually differ from one another) and pair 2 {S2, R2} from each Allais Paradox group (recall that SWUP 
predicts no difference between the minimal and transparent framings of pair 1 in each common consequence 
group; see Figure 4 and fn. 5). Frame invariance (implied by EU and CPT/RDU) predicts that risk tolerance 
(R′ or R2 choice proportions) should not significantly differ between frames, while SWUP predicts greater 
risk tolerance in minimal frames. In all twelve comparisons (and significantly at 1% or better), risky choice 
proportions are greater in minimal than transparent frames: On average across these twelve pairs, risky 
choice proportions are 30.9 percentage points higher in minimal (than transparent) frames. 
We expect that, as predicted by SWUP, dominance violations will be common in minimal frames 
(which is not predicted by EU or CPT/RDU) but very rare in transparent frames and our data bears this out. 
In transparent framings of the dominance violation pairs DV.A, DV.B and DV.C, dominance violations are 
just 3%, 2% and 3% of all choices, while in minimal framings dominance violations are 67%, 81% and 
57% of all choices. This is a strong failure of frame invariance. 
5.4 Results: Structural Parameter Estimates and Mixture Models 
We also have subjects’ choice data from the 60 estimation pairs, designed to better identify preference 
parameters than we could using only our 40 test pairs. We use 94 of the 100 total pairs8 to estimate 
parametric probabilistic choice specifications of EU, RDU, and SWUP. We regard our sampled population 
as (possibly) consisting of subpopulations, each composed of either EU, or RDU, or SWUP types, and 
estimate seven specifications of such a population: three specifications that assume our sampled population 
is composed solely of one type (either EU, or RDU, or SWUP); three specifications that assume our sampled 
population is a mixture of just two of the three types; and a specification that assumes all three types exist 
in our sampled population. The specifications composed of just EU and SWUP types, or of just EU and 
RDU types, are mixtures of rational agents (EU) and behavioral agents (either SWUP or RDU). This 
interpretation of comparing EU and SWUP is further motivated by the observation that EU is grounded in 
basic normative axioms and SWUP is grounded in basic psychological principles of perception. The 
mixture model of RDU and SWUP can be interpreted as comparing agents who value alternatives in 
isolation with context-independent preferences (RDU) and agents who choose by comparing alternatives 
jointly and who are sensitive to context and framing (SWUP). 
The specification containing all three types (EU, RDU, and SWUP) has a novel interpretation. 
Kahneman (2003) distinguishes three cognitive systems that he refers to as ‘perception’, ‘System 1’, and 
‘System 2’. We might conjecture that a different decision model is best suited for each system, given that 
                                                     
8 We omit the six dominance violation pairs from the estimations for technical reasons we discuss in our SM. 
Including them (by any reasonable method skirting the technical difficulty) would simply improve the performance 
of SWUP relative to EU and/or RDU. 
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they engage in different processes. Since RDU allows for optimism and pessimism to influence decisions 
under risk, RDU seems a plausible candidate for a model of affective decision making. In addition, Barberis 
et al. (2013) have argued that prospect theory (which coincides with RDU in our experiment) is a natural 
model of System 1 decision making. To the extent that System 2 decision making resembles an unbiased 
rational agent, it seems plausible that EU is an appropriate model for System 2. Since SWUP explicitly 
models salience perception and visual changes in the framing of decisions, it seems plausible that SWUP 
captures some aspects of perception-based choice. The final mixture model combining all three theories 
thus allows for “System 2” agents (represented by EU), “System 1” agents (represented by RDU), and 
“Perceptual” agents (represented by SWUP). A similar interpretation holds even without a multi-system 
framework: People may decide based on different heuristics, where some people typically choose the lottery 
that ‘looks better’ (represented in our analysis by SWUP), others typically choose the lottery that ‘feels 
better’ (represented by their degree of optimism or pessimism as modeled by RDU), and that others choose 
the lottery that they can ‘justify as better’ through logical reasoning (represented by their conformance to 
EU). Given that choices may be arrived at by such diverse decision processes, it may be that a different 
decision model is best suited for each of these modes of decision making.  
For each agent of each type, 𝜌𝜌 is the degree of utility or value function curvature, very similar to a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.9 We allow subjects of all three types (EU, RDU and SWUP) to have  
their own personal 𝜌𝜌 but we require that 𝜌𝜌 has a normal distribution with mean and variance 𝜇𝜇𝜌𝜌 and 𝜎𝜎𝜌𝜌 
(allowed to be specific to each type found in any mixture). The parameter 𝜆𝜆 is an inverse standard deviation 
of decision noise, frequently called precision or sensitivity in literature on probabilistic choice models. All 
three types (EU, RDU and SWUP) have the three parameters 𝜆𝜆, 𝜇𝜇𝜌𝜌 and 𝜎𝜎𝜌𝜌 in their choice models. Agents 
of the RDU type additionally have a weighting function and we use a two-parameter (𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽) form due to 
Prelec (1998) for this weighting function.10 The mixture parameters 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 (such as 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) are the proportion 
of the sampled population behaving according to each 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ∈ {𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝}.11  
Agents of the SWUP type additionally have two salience functions, one for payoffs and one for 
probabilities. To show the performance of SWUP in its parametrically leanest form, we use a parameter-
free salience function. One alternative is a BGS (based on Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012) salience 
function; whenever 𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢 > 0 or 𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢 > 0, this is  
                                                     
9 The utility function is 𝑠𝑠(𝑧𝑧) = (1 − 𝜌𝜌)−1�−1 + (1 + 𝑧𝑧)(1−𝜌𝜌)� for 𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0. It has two useful properties: (i) It is 
defined at 𝑧𝑧 = 0 ∀𝜌𝜌 ∈ ℝ, so that we can estimate specifications where 𝜌𝜌 has a distribution on ℝ (such as the normal 
distribution we employ); and (ii) 𝑠𝑠(0) ≡ 0 ∀𝜌𝜌 ∈ ℝ which is necessary for SWUP as well as RDU and CPT. 
10 This is 𝑠𝑠(𝐺𝐺) = exp (−𝛽𝛽(−ln(𝐺𝐺))𝛼𝛼), where 𝐺𝐺 is the decumulative distribution function of a lottery. 
11 Our SM details the probabilistic choice model of each type. 
18 
 
(10)  𝜎𝜎(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢) = |𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢−𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢||𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢|+|𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢| , and 𝜎𝜎(0,0) = 0. 
Although simple and parameter-free, (10) does not satisfy IPS. Given behaviors such as the fourfold pattern 
of risk attitudes, and the simultaneous purchase of lottery tickets and insurance policies that follow from 
IPS (Leland and Schneider, 2017), along with the general form of the Allais common ratio effect, it seems 
desirable for a salience function to also satisfy that property. Therefore we introduce a new salience function 
satisfying IPS. To motivate this, consider the two frames in Figure 11: the salience function in (10) assigns 
the same salience value to the comparison between 300 and 100 in both frames (σ(300,100) = 0.5). But 
perhaps that comparison is more salient in the top frame in Figure 11 (in which other payoffs are in the 
hundreds of dollars, in which case $200 is a big difference) than in the bottom frame in Figure 11 (where 
other payoffs are in the thousands of dollars, and the difference between 300 and 100 seems smaller).  
Figure 11. Context-dependence and Scale-dependence of Salience Perception 
           
  x1,y1 p1,q1 x2,y2 p2,q2 x3,y3 p3,q3 x4,y4 p4,q4  
 𝐩𝐩 300 0.25 200 0.25 100 0.25 0 0.25  
 𝐪𝐪 100 0.25 100 0.25 100 0.25 100 0.25             
  x1,y1 p1,q1 x2,y2 p2,q2 x3,y3 p3,q3 x4,y4 p4,q4  
 𝐩𝐩� 300 0.25 2000 0.25 1000 0.25 0 0.25  
 𝐪𝐪� 100 0.25 1000 0.25 1000 0.25 1000 0.25              
Such context-dependence and scale-dependence of salience perception can be accommodated by 
including a function that depends on all outcomes (or all probabilities) in a frame. One plausible candidate 
is the Euclidean norm which can be viewed as taking the second moment or the deviation of values from 0 
for all outcomes (or all probabilities) in a frame. Let (𝐚𝐚,𝐛𝐛) denote a vector of length 2𝑛𝑛, formed by 
horizontally concatenating a pair of like dimension vectors in a frame (i.e., all outcomes in a frame, or all 
probabilities in a frame); and let ‖𝐚𝐚,𝐛𝐛‖ denote the Euclidean norm of the vector (𝐚𝐚,𝐛𝐛). A context-dependent 
parameter-free IPS salience function can be defined as in (11): 
(11)  𝜎𝜎(𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢,𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢|𝐚𝐚,𝐛𝐛) = |𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢−𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢||𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢|+|𝐛𝐛𝐢𝐢|+‖𝐚𝐚,𝐛𝐛‖. 
This satisfies IPS for any frame, and under (11) the salience of (300, 100) is greater in the top frame in 
Figure 11 than in the bottom frame. We use this salience function for the SWUP type in our estimations. 
Table 2 shows the results of our estimations of seven specifications. The fit (the negative log likelihood 
in the last row of Table 2) of the mixture of EU and SWUP is only exceeded by specifications that nest it 
(the mixture of RDU and SWUP, and the mixture of all three types). RDU has the best fit among single-
type specifications, but keep several points in mind. First, RDU has two more preference parameters (its 
weighting function parameters) than do EU or SWUP; second, of the 94 pairs used in our estimations, 76  
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates, Single Theories and Mixture Models of Two or Three Theories 
  Theory (or theories in mixture specifications) estimated 
Theory Parameter EU RDU SWUP EU & RDU 
EU & 
SWUP 
RDU & 
SWUP all three                   
EU 𝜇𝜇𝜌𝜌 0.99   0.89 0.97  1.14 
  (0.032)   (0.030) (0.037)  (0.11)          
 𝜎𝜎𝜌𝜌 0.54   0.36 0.43  0.34 
  (0.031)   (0.038) (0.033)  (0.071)          
 𝜆𝜆 13.71   21.38 22.03  20.33 
  (0.42)   (1.3) (0.95)  (2.0)          
 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 1   0.31 0.42  0.20   —   (0.051) (0.047)  (0.043)                   
RDU 𝜇𝜇𝜌𝜌  1.20  1.25  1.05 1.06 
   (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.027) (0.027)          
 𝜎𝜎𝜌𝜌  0.30  0.28  0.30 0.28 
   (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.017) (0.020)          
 𝛼𝛼  0.86  0.79  0.99 0.89 
   (0.0082)  (0.012)  (0.015) (0.016)          
 𝛽𝛽  0.55  0.49  0.56 0.51 
   (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.019) (0.020)          
 𝜆𝜆  27.72  31.03  38.22 46.05 
   (0.78)  (1.2)  (1.5) (2.5)          
 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  1  0.69  0.51 0.37    —  (0.051)  (0.048) (0.050)                   
SWUP 𝜇𝜇𝜌𝜌   0.95  0.67 0.70 0.65 
    (0.066)  (0.090) (0.11) (0.10)          
 𝜎𝜎𝜌𝜌   1.04  0.83 0.85 0.83 
    (0.073)  (0.069) (0.076) (0.083)          
 𝜆𝜆   6.48  7.51 7.23 7.59 
    (0.17)  (0.27) (0.28) (0.34)          
 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡   1  0.58 0.49 0.43 
    —  (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)                   
 −𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 7771.69 7366.68 7478.05 7271.47 7219.4 7094.04 7050.4          
 
pairs are in minimal frames—what we regard as the standard presentation that RDU was essentially 
designed for; and third, the six stochastic dominance pairs excluded from our estimation are also the pairs 
in which EU and RDU performs worst (among all 100 pairs) and SWUP performs best. In the three-type 
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specification, the largest sub-population is represented by SWUP (comprising 43% of the overall 
population), with RDU and EU representing, respectively, 37% and 20% of the population.  
6. Minimal and Transparent Frames for Choice over Time: Present Bias and the Hidden Zero Effect 
Consider the minimal frames in Figure 12. The stationarity axiom of Discounted Utility theory implies 
that people should choose either 𝐫𝐫 and 𝐫𝐫′ or 𝐭𝐭 and 𝐭𝐭′. However, in choices such as these, experiments show 
that people frequently choose 𝐫𝐫 and 𝐭𝐭′, a finding termed present bias (Laibson, 1997). Present bias occurs 
in the minimal frames in Figure 12 since the comparison between receiving money today versus in one year 
is more salient than the comparison of $75 versus $100, but this monetary comparison is more salient than 
receiving payment in 10 years or 11 years. One might make a different prediction in transparent frames, 
however, based on the intuition that the focal comparisons in both choices are between $75 and $0 and 
between $100 and $0. Indeed, switching from minimal to transparent frames provides a formal explanation 
of the hidden zero effect (Magen et al., 2008; Radu et al., 2011; Read et al., 2017) in which behavior 
becomes more patient when the opportunity costs of income (such as receiving $0 instead of $100 in 1 year) 
are made salient. Transparent frames retain the second choice of 𝐭𝐭′ over 𝐫𝐫′ from minimal frames, but shift 
the first choice toward preferring 𝐭𝐭 over 𝐫𝐫 via the hidden zero effect. The prediction of more patient behavior 
in transparent frames is also consistent with the finding by Fisher and Rangel (2014) that shifting attention 
from focusing on time to focusing on money reduces impatience since transparent frames increase the 
salience of the money dimension relative to minimal frames. Transparent frames may thus serve to induce 
more patient behavior and more time consistent behavior. 
Figure 12. Present Bias in Minimal and Transparent Frames 
                
  In Minimal Frames   In Transparent Frames             
  x1,y1 Years   x1,y1 Years x2,y2 Years  
 𝐫𝐫 75 0  𝐫𝐫 75 0 0 1  
 𝐭𝐭 100 1  𝐭𝐭 0 0 100 1  
           
  x1,y1 Years   x1,y1 Years x2,y2 Years  
 𝐫𝐫′ 75 10  𝐫𝐫′ 75 10 0 11  
 𝐭𝐭′ 100 11  𝐭𝐭′ 0 10 100 11  
            
7. Minimal and Transparent Frames for Choice under Ambiguity: Ellsberg’s Paradox 
SWUP predicts that ambiguity aversion will be observed in minimal frames but mitigated by 
transparent frames. Figure 13 depicts two choice pairs {A, B} and {A′, B′} in minimal frames as Schneider, 
Leland, and Wilcox (2016) presented them to subjects. After making 60 such choices, one of the 60 choices 
is randomly selected for payoff: Suppose this was pair {A, B} and the subject chose B. The subject then 
draws a ticket from a bag, and if the ticket is red she plays a lottery in which there is a 75% chance of 
winning $25 and a 25% chance of winning nothing. If the ticket is blue, she instead plays a lottery in which 
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there is a 25% chance of winning $25 and a 75% chance of winning nothing. But notice that if she had 
chosen option A instead, she would play a lottery offering a 50% chance of winning $25 and a 50% chance 
of winning nothing irrespective of the ticket color. The pair {A′, B′} is similar except that in option B′ the 
“good” state is reversed. For these minimal frames, the experiment replicates Ellsberg’s Paradox, finding 
that people do not assign well-defined subjective probabilities to states, but rather prefer alternatives with 
known probabilities over unknown probabilities—a preference pattern called ambiguity aversion. 
Figure 13. The Ellsberg Paradox in Minimal Frames 
      
  Red Ticket  Blue Ticket  
 A $25 0.50 $0 0.50  $25 0.50 $0 0.50  
 B $25 0.75 $0 0.25  $25 0.25 $0 0.75        
  Red Ticket  Blue Ticket  
 A′ $25 0.50 $0 0.50  $25 0.50 $0 0.50  
 B′ $25 0.25 $0 0.75  $25 0.75 $0 0.25         
Under SWUP, with a uniform prior over states12 and normalizing 𝑠𝑠(25) = 1 and 𝑠𝑠(0) = 0, A is 
chosen over B in the minimal frame shown in the top panel of Figure 13 if  inequality (12) holds: 
(12)  0.5𝜙𝜙(0.5,0.75)(−0.25) + 0.5𝜙𝜙(0.5, 0.25)(0.25) > 0.  
By symmetry and DAS, 𝜙𝜙(0.5,0.25) > 𝜙𝜙(0.5,0.75), and (12) holds for any salience function and any 
utility function. Intuitively, the salient comparisons between A and B are between a 0.50 probability of 
winning and a 0.75 probability (in the ‘red’ state) and between probabilities of 0.50 and 0.25 (in the ‘blue’ 
state). Diminishing absolute sensitivity implies a focal thinker will be more sensitive to the latter 
comparison. Similarly, A′ is chosen over B′ in the bottom panel of Figure 13, yielding ambiguity aversion. 
Figure 14 shows Ellsberg-style choices in transparent frames. If the decision maker has a uniform prior 
over red and blue ticket states, then SWUP predicts ambiguity aversion in minimal frames, and ambiguity-
neutrality (indifference between A and B) in transparent frames. Ambiguity neutrality in transparent frames 
follows from symmetry of 𝜇𝜇, in which case (13) holds: 
(13)  0.5𝜇𝜇(0,25)(−6.25) + 0.5𝜇𝜇(25, 0)(6.25) = 0.  
The transparent frame focuses attention on comparing $0 and $25 rather than probabilities. If the decision 
maker has a uniform prior over red and blue ticket states, then a focal thinker exhibits ambiguity aversion 
in minimal frames, and ambiguity-neutrality (indifference between A and B) in transparent frames. 
Schneider, Leland, and Wilcox (2016) considered the simple setting of a world with two types of 
agents – those who are ambiguity-averse (agents who always choose A), and those who are ambiguity-
neutral (agents who randomize between A and B with equal probability). They computed the unique 
                                                     
12 In estimating a mean-dispersion model of ambiguity preference to explain their data, Schneider, Leland, and 
Wilcox (2016) estimate the subjective prior assigned to red and blue ticket states to be uniform.  
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proportion of ambiguity neutral agents which exactly fits the distribution of ambiguity-averse and 
ambiguity-seeking choices observed in their experimental data, for both minimal and transparent frames. 
This approach estimated there to be about 43% ambiguity-neutral agents in minimal frames but 63% 
ambiguity neutral agents in transparent frames. While this framing effect is predicted by SWUP, we are not 
aware of an alternative model that predicts this frame-dependence of ambiguity aversion. 
Figure 14.  The Ellsberg Paradox in Transparent Frames 
      
  Red Ticket  Blue Ticket  
 A $0 0.25 $25 0.50 $0 0.25  $25 0.25 $25 0.25 $0 0.50  
 B $25 0.25 $25 0.50 $0 0.25  $0 0.25 $25 0.25 $0 0.50  
      
  Red Ticket  Blue Ticket  
 A′ $25 0.25 $25 0.25 $0 0.50  $0 0.25 $25 0.50 $0 0.25  
 B′ $0 0.25 $25 0.25 $0 0.50  $25 0.25 $25 0.50 $0 0.25  
       
8. Summary 
We now gather our results on framing effects for risk, time, and ambiguity in three propositions. Earlier 
in sections 4, 6 and 7 we illustrated the claims in Proposition 1: formal demonstrations appear in our SM. 
Proposition 1 (Minimal Frames and Behavioral Biases): 
A focal thinker with linear utility 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥 and either the BGS salience function (10) or our IPS salience 
function (11): 
(i) violates stochastic dominance in the minimal frame in Figure 3; 
(ii) exhibits the Allais paradox in the minimal frames in Figure 4; 
(iii) exhibits the common ratio effect in the minimal frames in Figure 5; 
(iv) exhibits present bias in the minimal frames in Figure 12  (for annual discount factor 𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0.41, 0.95]); 
 (v) and exhibits Ellsberg's paradox in the minimal frames in Figure 13. 
For minimal frames, we prove more general results regarding two of the most robust and most well-
known violations of expected utility theory: the Allais common ratio effect and the Ellsberg paradox. 
Although these paradoxes are two of the oldest violations of rational choice theory, there has been relatively 
little work investigating the precise relationship between them. Proposition 2 is proved in our Appendix, 
for general versions of the Allais common ratio effect and Ellsberg’s paradox also defined in the Appendix. 
Proposition 2 (Allais, Ellsberg, and Salience Perception): For monotone minimal frames: 
(i)  A focal thinker exhibits the general Allais common ratio effect if and only if 𝜙𝜙 satisfies increasing   
       proportional sensitivity. 
(ii)  Under a uniform prior, a focal thinker exhibits ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg’s paradox if 𝜙𝜙 satisfies 
diminishing absolute sensitivity. 
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Proposition 2 is general and establishes that two basic properties of the perceptual system (greater 
sensitivity to larger absolute differences for a fixed ratio (IPS), and greater sensitivity to larger ratios for a 
fixed absolute difference (DAS)) directly imply the most robust violations of expected utility theory without 
any parametric assumptions regarding the form of the agent’s salience functions or utility functions.  
Without defining them precisely, Savage (1954) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued that 
transparent presentations would reduce violations of rational choice theory. We formalized ‘transparent 
presentation’ of choice alternatives for risk, ambiguity, and time using a set of properties which imply 
unique transparent frames. With this done we can now state a theorem concerning transparent frames—
converting a long-standing suggestion into a set of falsifiable statements. Consider four types of systematic 
violations of rational choice theory: violations of stochastic dominance, Allais paradox violations of 
expected utility theory, present biased violations of discounted utility theory, and Ellsberg paradox 
violations of subjective expected utility theory. We show they should all vanish under our definition of 
transparent framing: This Transparent Frame Theorem is proved in our Appendix. 
Proposition 3 (Transparent Frame Theorem): For transparent frames, a focal thinker will not exhibit 
the following violations of rational choice theory, even if the focal thinker exhibits them in minimal frames: 
(i) Violations of Stochastic Dominance 
(ii) Allais Paradox violations of Expected Utility theory 
(iii) Common Ratio violations of Expected Utility theory 
(iv) Present Bias violations of Discounted Utility theory 
(v) Ellsberg Paradox violations of Subjective Expected Utility theory 
The transparent frame theorem is general in that it does not depend on the form of the decision maker’s 
salience functions or on the form of the decision maker’s utility function or discount factor or subjective 
beliefs, or on the particular parameter values used for the paradoxes, and it applies to choices across the 
domains of risk, time, and uncertainty. 
For risk, transparent frames are similar to the state matrices employed by Savage (1954) (but implying 
neither correlation nor independence between payoffs) and to the ‘canonical split form’ of Birnbaum and 
Schmidt’s (2015) tree presentation of lotteries, but are distinct in that the canonical split form does not 
separate common consequences from distinct consequences. For decisions under risk, minimal frames are 
related to Birnbaum’s (1999) tree presentation of lotteries in ‘coalesced form:’ In particular, a choice set in 
which all lotteries are in coalesced form generates a minimal frame. We are not aware of any previous 
attempt to formalize different presentation formats for income streams.  
We suggest two avenues for subsequent research. First, one might apply SWUP to choices between 
complex multiple outcome gambles and investigate whether it can explain novel findings such as data 
supporting the probability of winning heuristic (Venkatraman, Payne, and Huettel, 2014). Second, one 
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might normalize salience weights to sum to one (see our probabilistic choice model for SWUP in our SM). 
One might interpret such normalized salience weights as the distribution of attention across the column 
vectors in the frame. Eye-tracking studies might then test whether subjects focus on particular comparisons 
in proportion to these normalized weights.  
Our definitions of frames and our formal distinctions between minimal and transparent frames provide 
a unified foundation for analyzing choice presentations across three major domains of individual choice. 
Combine that foundation with a decision model that operates on frames (such as SWUP), and a formal logic 
of framing effects emerges. Our foundation may also be a useful tool to help control for non-random 
variation in experiments or decision analysis. We found, for instance, that changes from minimal to 
transparent frames for the same choice alternatives can generate increases in the proportion of safe choices 
by 20 to 30 percentage points. This is a large and systematic shift in risk preferences arising from small 
changes in framing. Earlier work by Harless (1992), Starmer and Sugden (1993), Humphrey (1995), and 
by Birnbaum and colleagues (e.g., Birnbaum and Chavez 1997; Birnbaum and Navarrete 1998) also 
observed significant framing effects for risk due to changes in presentation formats.  
The same mathematical structure—and the same psychological intuition—explains a variety of the 
most robust and well-known behavioral biases across the domains of risk, uncertainty, and time, violating 
four of the most well-known axioms in rational choice theory (stochastic dominance, independence, 
stationarity, and the sure-thing principle). Focal thinkers will violate these axioms in minimal frames but 
satisfy them in transparent frames. Evidence from previous literature and from our own experiment suggests 
that biases are reduced, but not eliminated, when the presentation of choice alternatives is made transparent.  
 
Appendix 
Here, 𝐯𝐯 ≻� 𝐰𝐰 (𝐯𝐯 ~�  𝐰𝐰) means that for focal thinkers, option 𝑣𝑣 ‘looks strictly better than’ (‘looks indifferent 
to’) option 𝑠𝑠 when a frame ⟦𝐯𝐯,𝐰𝐰⟧ (of type specified in each proposition) presents the choice pair {𝑣𝑣,𝑠𝑠}.  
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2 (Allais and Ellsberg in Minimal Frames) 
We define the general form of the Allais common ratio effect below: 
Definition 2 (General Allais Common Ratio Effect): Consider monotone minimal frames (i) and (ii) in 
Figure A.1. The general Allais common ratio effect holds for focal thinkers if for all 𝐲𝐲 > 𝐱𝐱 > 𝟎𝟎, 1 ≥ 𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏 >
𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏 > 0 and 𝛂𝛂 ∈ (0,1), 𝐩𝐩 ~�  𝐪𝐪, implies 𝐪𝐪′ ≻� 𝐩𝐩′. 
Figure A.1  Minimal Frame for the General Allais Common Ratio Effect 
            
 (i) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)   (ii) (x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2)  
 𝐩𝐩 𝐱𝐱 𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏  𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏  𝐩𝐩′ 𝐱𝐱 𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏  𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏   
 𝐪𝐪 𝐲𝐲 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏  𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏  𝐪𝐪′ 𝐲𝐲 𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏  𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏                
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Proof of Proposition 2 (i): Note that  𝐩𝐩 ~�  𝐪𝐪 in Figure A.1 choice (i) if and only if  
𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱, 𝐲𝐲)�𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱)� �𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏 + 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏2 � = 𝜙𝜙(𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏, 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏)(𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏) �𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲) + 𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱)2 �. 
Also note that 𝐪𝐪′ ≻� 𝐩𝐩′  if and only if  𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱, 𝐲𝐲)�𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱)� �𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏+𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏
2
� > 𝜙𝜙�𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏,𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏��𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏� �𝑒𝑒(𝐲𝐲)+𝑒𝑒(𝐱𝐱)2 �. 
By IPS, scaling 𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏 and 𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏 each by 
1
𝛂𝛂
 leads to 𝜙𝜙�𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏,𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏� < 𝜙𝜙�𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏,𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏� for all 𝛂𝛂 ∈ (0,1). Letting 𝐤𝐤 ≡1/𝛂𝛂, the common ratio effect holds if and only if  �𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏,𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏� < 𝜙𝜙�𝐤𝐤𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏,𝐤𝐤𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪𝟏𝟏� for all 𝐤𝐤 > 1. ∎ 
Next, consider Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color paradox. There are two urns. Urn 1 contains 50 red and 50 black 
balls. Urn 2 contains an unknown mixture of 100 red and black balls. A person is given two choices:   
Subjective expected utility (SEU) requires choices of either A and D or B and C. However, Ellsberg found 
that most people choose A and C (options with objective probabilities) over B and D (options with 
ambiguous probabilities) thereby exhibiting ambiguity aversion. The minimal frame for these choices (for 
each state 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {0, 1, … , 100}, the actual number of red balls in Urn 2) is displayed in Figure A.2, where q(s) is the probability of drawing a red ball from Urn 2 in state 𝑠𝑠.  
Figure A.2. Minimal Frame for the Two-Color Ellsberg Paradox 
       
 A(s) $100 0.5 $0 0.5  
 B(s) $100 q(s) $0 1 − q(s)  
       
 C(s) $100 0.5 $0 0.5  
 D(s) $100 1 − q(s) $0 q(s)  
        
Definition 3 (Ambiguity Aversion in Ellsberg’s Paradox): For the frames in Figure A.2, a focal thinker 
exhibits ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg’s paradox if  𝐀𝐀 ≻� 𝐁𝐁 and 𝐂𝐂 ≻�D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (ii): This proof is for Ellsberg’s two-color paradox. An analogous argument 
resolves Ellsberg’s three-color paradox. Let 𝑠𝑠 denote the number of red balls in Urn 2. Since the number of 
black balls is 100 − 𝑠𝑠, the state of the urn is fully characterized by 𝑠𝑠. For each state, the presentation for 
Choice 1 is given by Figure A.2, where 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢) is the probability of drawing a red ball from Urn 2 in state 𝑠𝑠. 
Without loss of generality, we normalize the payoffs such that 𝑠𝑠(𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎) = 1, and 𝑠𝑠(𝟎𝟎) = 0. For a focal 
thinker, A is chosen over B if and only if inequality (14) holds. Under a uniform prior, (14) becomes (15): 
(14)  ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠=1  [ϕ�𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)��𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)�]  > 0.        
(15)  1
101
[∑ ϕ�𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)��𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)�𝑠𝑠=50𝑠𝑠=0 + ∑ ϕ�𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)��𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)�]𝑠𝑠=100𝑠𝑠=51 > 0, which implies 
(16)  ∑ ϕ�𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)��𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)�𝑠𝑠=50𝑠𝑠=0 + ∑ ϕ(𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢))(𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢) − 𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓)𝑠𝑠=50𝑠𝑠=0 > 0.  
Choice 1: Choose between A and B 
A. Win $100 if red is drawn from Urn 1 
B. Win $100 if red is drawn from Urn 2 
Choice 2: Choose between C and D 
C. Win $100 if black is drawn from Urn 1 
D. Win $100 if black is drawn from Urn 2 
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To see that (14) holds, note that for each 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢) ∈ [0,0.5) diminishing absolute sensitivity and symmetry of 
ϕ imply ϕ(𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪(𝒔𝒔)) < ϕ(𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)). In particular, by symmetry, ϕ(𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓,𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)) = ϕ(𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 +
𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢),𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢) + 𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 − 𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢)) = ϕ(𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 + 𝛜𝛜,𝐪𝐪(𝐢𝐢) + 𝛜𝛜). Thus, by diminishing absolute sensitivity, (16) 
holds, yielding a choice for the risky over the ambiguous urn. The argument follows analogously for the 
choice between C and D, resulting in ambiguity aversion. ∎  
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3 (Transparent Frame Theorem) 
Proof of Proposition 3 (i): Lottery 𝑝𝑝 is defined to stochastically dominate 𝑞𝑞 if 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 𝑄𝑄(𝑥𝑥) for all 𝑥𝑥 ∈ X, 
with at least one strict inequality, where 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥) and 𝑄𝑄(𝑥𝑥) are the cumulative distribution functions 
corresponding to 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞, respectively. Whenever 𝑝𝑝 stochastically dominates 𝑞𝑞, 𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢 ≥ 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢 and 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 − 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢 = 0 
for all 𝑖𝑖 in a transparent frame. Thus, the salience weights in (4) favor 𝐩𝐩 over 𝐪𝐪 in each binary comparison 
where the differences are not zero. ∎   
Proof of Proposition 3 (ii), (iii): We show that this result applies to both Allais paradoxes – the common 
consequence effect and the common ratio effect. The Allais common consequence choices in transparent 
frames are displayed in Figure A.3, where 𝐱𝐱 > 𝐲𝐲 > 𝟎𝟎, 𝐪𝐪 > 𝐩𝐩, and 𝐪𝐪,𝐩𝐩 ∈ (0,1).   
Figure A.3. The Allais Common Consequence Effect in Transparent Frames 
         
 𝐩𝐩 𝐱𝐱 𝐩𝐩 𝟎𝟎 𝐪𝐪 − 𝐩𝐩 𝐲𝐲 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪  
 𝐪𝐪 𝐲𝐲 𝐩𝐩 𝐲𝐲 𝐪𝐪 − 𝐩𝐩 𝐲𝐲 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪  
         
 𝐩𝐩′ 𝐱𝐱 𝐩𝐩 𝟎𝟎 𝐪𝐪 − 𝐩𝐩 𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪  
 𝐪𝐪′ 𝐲𝐲 𝐩𝐩 𝐲𝐲 𝐪𝐪 − 𝐩𝐩 𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐪𝐪  
          
A focal thinker does not exhibit the common consequence effect if either 𝐩𝐩 ≻� 𝐪𝐪 and 𝐩𝐩′ ≻� 𝐪𝐪′ or 𝐪𝐪 ≻� 𝐩𝐩 and 
𝐪𝐪′ ≻� 𝐩𝐩′. For focal thinkers, (4) implies that common consequences cancel, so 𝐩𝐩 ≻� 𝐪𝐪 iff 𝐩𝐩′ ≻� 𝐪𝐪′. ∎     
The choices for the general form of the Allais common ratio effect are shown in transparent frames in 
Figure A.4, where 𝐲𝐲 > 𝐱𝐱 > 𝟎𝟎, 𝟏𝟏 ≥ 𝐩𝐩 > 𝐪𝐪 > 𝟎𝟎, and 𝛂𝛂 ∈ (0,1).  
Figure A.4. The Allais Common Ratio Effect in Transparent Frames 
         
 𝐩𝐩 𝐱𝐱 𝐪𝐪 𝟎𝟎 𝐩𝐩 − 𝐪𝐪 𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐩𝐩  
 𝐪𝐪 𝐲𝐲 𝐪𝐪 𝐲𝐲 𝐩𝐩 − 𝐪𝐪 𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝐩𝐩  
         
 𝐩𝐩′ 𝐱𝐱 𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪 𝟎𝟎 𝛂𝛂(𝐩𝐩 − 𝐪𝐪) 𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩  
 𝐪𝐪′ 𝐲𝐲 𝛂𝛂𝐪𝐪 𝐲𝐲 𝛂𝛂(𝐩𝐩 − 𝐪𝐪) 𝟎𝟎 𝟏𝟏 − 𝛂𝛂𝐩𝐩  
          
A focal thinker does not exhibit the Allais common ratio paradox if either 𝐩𝐩 ≻� 𝐪𝐪 and 𝐩𝐩′ ≻� 𝐪𝐪′ or 𝐪𝐪 ≻� 𝐩𝐩 and 
𝐪𝐪′ ≻� 𝐩𝐩′. For focal thinkers, (4) implies that the constant 𝛂𝛂 factors out, so that 𝐩𝐩 ≻� 𝐪𝐪 iff 𝐩𝐩′ ≻� 𝐪𝐪′. ∎ 
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Proof of Proposition 3 (iv): Choices for a test of present bias are shown in Figure A.5 in transparent frames.  
Figure A.5. Present Bias in Transparent Frames 
            
 𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒 𝐱𝐱 𝟎𝟎 𝟎𝟎 ∆ 𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒′  𝐱𝐱 𝐭𝐭 𝟎𝟎 𝐭𝐭 + ∆  
 𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋 𝟎𝟎 𝟎𝟎 𝐲𝐲 ∆ 𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋′  𝟎𝟎 𝐭𝐭 𝐲𝐲 𝐭𝐭 + ∆  
            
 
Present bias is absent if either 𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒 ≻�𝐭𝐭 𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋 and 𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒′ ≻�𝐭𝐭 𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋′ or 𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋 ≻�𝐭𝐭 𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒 and 𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋′ ≻�𝐭𝐭 𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒′. For a focal thinker, 
(6) gives both SS ≻�𝑡𝑡 LL iff 𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱,𝟎𝟎)𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱) > 𝜇𝜇(𝟎𝟎, 𝐲𝐲)𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲)𝛿𝛿∆ and SS′ ≻�𝑡𝑡 LL′ iff 𝜇𝜇(𝐱𝐱,𝟎𝟎)𝑠𝑠(𝐱𝐱)𝛿𝛿𝐭𝐭 >
𝜇𝜇(𝟎𝟎, 𝐲𝐲)𝑠𝑠(𝐲𝐲)𝛿𝛿𝐭𝐭+∆. Since 𝛿𝛿𝒕𝒕 can be factored out of the latter, SS ≻�𝑡𝑡 LL iff SS′ ≻�𝑡𝑡 LL′. ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3 (v): The transparent frames for Choices 1 and 2 in Ellsberg’s two-color paradox 
are shown in Figure A.6, where state 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {0,1, … ,100} indexes the number of red balls in Urn 2, and 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) =|50 − 𝑠𝑠|/100. Note that when 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) = 0.25, Figure A.6 resembles the frame in Figure 14. Ellsberg’s 
paradox absent if either 𝐀𝐀 ≻� 𝐁𝐁 and 𝐃𝐃 ≻� 𝐂𝐂 or 𝐁𝐁 ≻� 𝐀𝐀 and 𝐂𝐂 ≻� 𝐃𝐃 or if there is indifferent in both choices. 
Without loss of generality, set 𝑠𝑠(100) = 1 and 𝑠𝑠(0) = 0. Denote the set of states favoring A by 𝑆𝑆 and the 
set of states favoring B by 𝑆𝑆. The SWUP evaluation for the choice between A and B is: 
(17)  ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆 𝜇𝜇(100,0)�𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)� + ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆 𝜇𝜇(0,100)�−𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)�   
Figure A.6. The Ellsberg Paradox in Transparent Frames 
      
   States favoring A: 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {0,1, … ,50}  States favoring B: 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {51,52, … ,100}  
 A $100 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $0 0.5  $0 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 $0 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)  
 B $0 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $0 0.5  $100 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 $0 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)  
      
   States favoring C: 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {51,52, … ,100}  States favoring D: 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {0,1, … ,50}  
 C $100 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $0 0.5  $0 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 $0 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)  
 D $0 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $0 0.5  $100 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠) $100 0.5 $0 0.5 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)  
       
where 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 is the subjective probability that the true state is 𝑠𝑠. All other differences within each column in 
the frame cancel. Under a uniform prior, the decision maker is indifferent between A and B (by symmetry 
of 𝜇𝜇) in which case the evaluation in (17) equals zero. Moreover, even if the distribution is not uniform, 
(17) implies ambiguity neutrality since if (17) is positive, the decision maker would prefer A and D since 
the same set of states favor A and D. If (17) is negative, the decision maker prefers B and C. This argument 
extends analogously to Ellsberg’s (1961) three-color paradox. ∎   
A.3 Minimal Frames 
Definition 4 (Minimal Frame: Risk): For two non-degenerate lotteries 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋𝑋), frame ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ (such as 
in the top panel of Figure 1) is minimal if ∀ 𝐢𝐢 ≠ 𝐣𝐣, 𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢 ≠ 𝐱𝐱𝐣𝐣 and 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢 ≠ 𝐲𝐲𝐣𝐣. 
Definition 5 (Monotone Frame: Risk): For two non-degenerate lotteries 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋𝑋), frame ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ (such 
as in the top panel of Figure 1) is monotone if 𝐱𝐱𝟏𝟏 ≥ 𝐱𝐱𝟐𝟐 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝐱𝐱𝐧𝐧 and 𝐲𝐲𝟏𝟏 ≥ 𝐲𝐲𝟐𝟐 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝐲𝐲𝐧𝐧. 
The following result is immediate.  
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Proposition 4 (Uniqueness of Monotone Minimal Frames: Risk): For any lotteries 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋𝑋) with |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)| = |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞)|, a monotone minimal frame ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ is unique up to the operation of row-switching. 
Proof: A frame that is minimal and monotonic is strictly monotonic. Hence, for two lotteries with the same 
support size, the ith best outcome of 𝑝𝑝 is in the same column vector as the ith best outcome of 𝑞𝑞.∎  
Minimal frames can also be defined for choices over time.  
Definition 6 (Minimal Frame: Time): For income streams 𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶, frame ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧ (such as in the bottom 
panel of Figure 1) is minimal if it has the smallest number of columns necessary to present {𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑡}. 
Definition 7 (Monotone Frame: Time)13: For income streams 𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶, frame ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧ (such as in the bottom 
panel of Figure 1) is monotone if 𝐫𝐫𝟏𝟏 < 𝐫𝐫𝟐𝟐 < ⋯ < 𝐫𝐫𝐧𝐧 and 𝐭𝐭𝟏𝟏 < 𝐭𝐭𝟐𝟐 < ⋯ < 𝐭𝐭𝐧𝐧. 
Let the support of an income stream, 𝑟𝑟, be the set of non-zero outcomes in 𝑟𝑟, and denote it by 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟).  
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness of Monotone Minimal Frames: Time): For any streams 𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶, with |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟)| = |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)|, a monotone minimal frame ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧  is unique up to the operation of row-switching. 
The proof of Proposition 5 is analogous to that of Proposition 4. Propositions 4 and 5 guarantee uniqueness 
of monotone minimal frames when both lotteries or both income streams have the same support size.  
A.4 Transparent Frames 
We next define transparent frames and show they are uniquely defined under general conditions (even if 
the lotteries or income streams have different support sizes). Given two lotteries, 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞, a pair (𝑥𝑥, 𝑟𝑟), 
consisting of an outcome 𝑥𝑥 with probability 𝑟𝑟, is a common consequence if 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝) ∩ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) and 
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝑟𝑟, 𝑞𝑞(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝑟𝑟. All other pairs of outcomes and corresponding probabilities are distinct 
consequences. That is, a common consequence between two lotteries is one with the same outcome 
occurring with the same probability in both lotteries. We say (𝑥𝑥, 𝑟𝑟) is a maximal common consequence if (𝑥𝑥, 𝑟𝑟) is a common consequence for which 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑟𝑟 or 𝑞𝑞(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑟𝑟 (or both). Our definition of transparent 
frames is constructive: it uniquely specifies how to construct a transparent frame given any pair of lotteries.  
Definition 8 (Transparent Frame: Risk): A transparent frame for lotteries ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ is the special case of 
the frame in the top panel of Figure 1 that has the following properties:   
(1) Presentation of outcome-probability pairs (Common Consequence Separation): All (maximal) 
common consequences are separated from all distinct consequences such that all maximal common 
consequences are adjacent, and all distinct consequences are adjacent, as shown in Figure A.7.14 
(2) Presentation of outcomes (monotonicity): Outcomes are ordered such that  
𝐱𝐱𝐧𝐧 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝐱𝐱𝟏𝟏;  𝐲𝐲𝐧𝐧 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝐲𝐲𝟏𝟏;  𝐳𝐳𝐤𝐤 > ⋯ > 𝐳𝐳𝟏𝟏. 
 
                                                     
13 For our results, it does not matter whether monotone frames of income streams are monotonic in outcomes or 
monotonic in time periods, nor does it matter whether monotonic frames are increasing or decreasing.  
14 In Figure A.7, there are 𝑘𝑘 common consequences (with corresponding outcomes 𝑧𝑧1,…,𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘) where 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0. The 
remaining pairs of payoff column vectors and corresponding probability column vectors are distinct consequences.   
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(3) Presentation of probabilities (alignment): Probabilities are presented so that ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [𝑘𝑘 + 1, 𝑘𝑘 + 𝑛𝑛]: 
(i) 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 = 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢; and 
(ii) Given 𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢 = 𝑥𝑥 and 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢 = 𝑦𝑦, 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) − ∑ 𝐩𝐩𝐣𝐣,𝑗𝑗<𝑖𝑖:𝐱𝐱𝐣𝐣=𝑥𝑥  𝑞𝑞(𝑦𝑦) − ∑ 𝐪𝐪𝐣𝐣𝑗𝑗<𝑖𝑖:𝐲𝐲𝐣𝐣=𝑦𝑦 �. 
(4) Relevance: 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 > 𝟎𝟎 for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘𝑘 + 𝑛𝑛]. 
Figure A.7.  Transparent Frame of Lotteries 𝒑𝒑 and 𝒒𝒒 
                
       𝐩𝐩 𝐱𝐱𝐧𝐧 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤+𝐧𝐧 … 𝐱𝐱𝐤𝐤+𝐢𝐢 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤+𝐢𝐢 … 𝐱𝐱𝟏𝟏 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤+𝟏𝟏 𝐳𝐳𝐤𝐤 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤 … 𝐳𝐳𝟏𝟏 𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏  
       𝐪𝐪 𝐲𝐲𝐧𝐧 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤+𝐧𝐧 … 𝐲𝐲𝐤𝐤+𝐢𝐢 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤+𝐢𝐢 … 𝐲𝐲𝟏𝟏 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤+𝟏𝟏 𝐳𝐳𝐤𝐤 𝐩𝐩𝐤𝐤 … 𝐳𝐳𝟏𝟏 𝐩𝐩𝟏𝟏                  
 
 
In (3-ii), 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) is the overall probability of outcome 𝑥𝑥 in lottery 𝑝𝑝, and 𝐩𝐩𝐣𝐣 is the probability of outcome 𝐱𝐱𝐣𝐣 
in the jth payoff column vector in the frame. Note that ∑ 𝐩𝐩𝐣𝐣𝑗𝑗<𝑖𝑖:𝐱𝐱𝐣𝐣=𝑥𝑥  is the cumulative probability of outcome 
𝑥𝑥 that is summed over the preceding columns in the frame. The expression for 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 ensures that either the 
entire remaining probability mass for outcome 𝑥𝑥 or for outcome 𝑦𝑦 will be completely used in column 𝐢𝐢 in 
the frame. The algorithm for computing these probabilities (property (3-ii)) thus ensures compactness (the 
frame has the fewest cells subject to satisfying properties (1), (2), (3-i), and (4)) and it ensures completeness 
– the probabilities in each row vector of the frame sum to 1. The algorithm in (3-ii) also ensures uniqueness 
(the frame is uniquely defined even for lotteries with different support sizes), and it is constructive, by 
specifying how to generate the frame given any pair of lotteries.  
 
Proposition 6 (Uniqueness of Transparent Frames: Risk): For any lotteries 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋𝑋) with finite 
support, there is a unique transparent frame ⟦𝐩𝐩,𝐪𝐪⟧ up to the operation of row-switching. 
Proof of Proposition 6 (Uniqueness of Transparent Frames: Risk): By monotonicity, the display of the 
𝑘𝑘 maximal common consequences is strictly monotonic, and thereby unique. For distinct consequences, 
monotonicity, in conjunction with the algorithm for 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢, (alignment properties (3-i) and (3-ii) uniquely 
determines each subsequent cell in the frame and so the frame is unique (There is only one possible 
specification implied by 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢 for each probability and corresponding payoff column vector for each cell 𝑖𝑖 ∈(𝑘𝑘 + 1, 𝑘𝑘 + 𝑛𝑛)). ∎15  
Definition 9 (Transparent Frame: Time): A transparent frame ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧ for income streams 𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 is the 
special case of the frame in the bottom panel of Figure 1 that satisfies the following properties.  
(1) Common Consequence Separation: Common consequences are separated from distinct consequences 
such that common consequences are adjacent and distinct consequences are adjacent as in Figure A.816. 
(2) Alignment: 𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐢 = 𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐢 for all 𝑖𝑖. 
                                                     
15 Note that in the cases of transparent risk frames, both alignment properties (3-i) and (3-ii) are used to confer 
uniqueness. For choices over time, we only require an alignment property similar to (3-i). 
16 In Figure A.8, there are 𝑚𝑚 common consequences (with corresponding outcomes 𝑧𝑧1,…,𝑧𝑧𝑚𝑚) where 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0. The 
remaining pairs of payoff column vectors and corresponding time column vectors are distinct consequences.   
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(3) Monotonicity: Time periods are ordered monotonically such that 𝐭𝐭𝟏𝟏 < ⋯ < 𝐭𝐭𝐤𝐤;  𝐭𝐭𝐤𝐤+𝟏𝟏 < ⋯ < 𝐭𝐭𝐧𝐧. 
(4) Completeness and Relevance: The first and last period in ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧ are the same as in 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑡𝑡 and        
𝐧𝐧 = T, where n is the number of periods in the frame and T is the time horizon of the income streams.  
Figure A.8.  Transparent Frame of Income streams 𝒓𝒓 and 𝒕𝒕 
                
       𝐫𝐫 𝐱𝐱𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫𝟏𝟏 … 𝐱𝐱𝐢𝐢 𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐢 … 𝐱𝐱𝐤𝐤 𝐫𝐫𝐤𝐤 𝐳𝐳𝟏𝟏 𝐫𝐫𝐤𝐤+𝟏𝟏 … 𝐳𝐳𝐦𝐦 𝐫𝐫𝐧𝐧  
       𝐭𝐭 𝐲𝐲𝟏𝟏 𝐭𝐭𝟏𝟏 … 𝐲𝐲𝐢𝐢 𝐭𝐭𝐢𝐢 … 𝐲𝐲𝐤𝐤 𝐭𝐭𝐤𝐤 𝐳𝐳𝟏𝟏 𝐭𝐭𝐤𝐤+𝟏𝟏 … 𝐳𝐳𝐦𝐦 𝐭𝐭𝐧𝐧                  
 
Proposition 7 (Uniqueness of Transparent Frames: Time): For any income streams 𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 over a 
horizon of T periods there is a unique transparent frame ⟦𝐫𝐫, 𝐭𝐭⟧ up to the operation of row-switching. 
Proof of Proposition 7 (Uniqueness of Transparent Frames: Time): By completeness and relevance, all 
(and only) time periods that index the income streams are displayed in the frame. By alignment, the ith 
period in stream r in the frame is in the same column vector as the ith period in stream t. By monotonicity, 
the ordering of the periods in the frame is uniquely determined and the frame is unique. ∎  
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